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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 This case returns to us on a “grant, vacate, and 
remand” (“GVR”) order of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  Our earlier precedential opinion and judgment of 
March 3, 2016 had affirmed defendant-appellant Steiner’s 
conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon 
(18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).1  We did not reach challenges to 
Steiner’s sentence, as he had not raised any.   
 The Supreme Court’s GVR order2 instructs us to 
reconsider our decision in light of Mathis v. United States,3 
the Court’s latest case about predicate offenses and the 
“categorical approach.”  We asked the parties to file short 
supplemental statements addressing both the impact of Mathis 
on our previous opinion and the merits of Steiner’s Mathis 
challenge more generally; Steiner also separately moved to 
remand for expedited resentencing.  Both Steiner and the 
government agree that Mathis did not affect the validity of 
our earlier decision affirming Steiner’s conviction.  They also 
agree that it does affect Steiner’s sentence; the District Court 
used a 1993 Pennsylvania burglary conviction as a predicate 
“crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, which the government now concedes was plain 
error. 
                                              
1 See generally United States v. Steiner, 815 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 
2016).   
2 See Steiner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 494 (2016).  
3 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
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  Because we agree with the parties that, under Mathis, 
Steiner’s 1993 burglary conviction was not a predicate “crime 
of violence” under the Guidelines—and, thus, that his 
Guidelines range should not have been enhanced—we will 
grant Steiner’s motion for summary action, vacate the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence, and remand for expedited 
resentencing.  Steiner is to be released from federal custody 
pending resentencing, subject to the supervised release terms 
contained in the District Court’s judgment of sentence.   And 
because our previous precedential opinion was not at all 
affected by Mathis, we will once again affirm Steiner’s 
conviction.  We therefore revise and reissue below our 
previous precedential opinion as altered by our Mathis 
discussion and the alternative disposition it requires.   
I. BACKGROUND4 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 During the execution of two separate search warrants 
at properties that police believed were owned or occupied by 
defendant Thomas Steiner, police seized, among other things, 
a sawed-off shotgun, .32 and .38 caliber ammunition, and 12 
gauge shotgun ammunition.  As a result, Steiner was indicted 
on two counts for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm and 
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Following a 
4-day trial, he was convicted on one count of felony-
                                              
4 Subject matter jurisdiction was conferred upon the District 
Court by 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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possession of ammunition and sentenced to an 87-month 
prison term.   
 During the trial, the government introduced into 
evidence the fact that a warrant had issued for Steiner’s arrest 
on an unrelated charge.  Steiner contends that the District 
Court improperly admitted evidence of the arrest warrant that 
was unrelated to the offenses he faced at trial.  He also argues 
that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that 
it was required to reach a unanimous verdict as to each type 
of ammunition seized.  While we conclude that the admission 
of the unrelated arrest warrant was error, the error was 
harmless.  We also conclude that the District Court did not err 
when it declined to provide a unanimity instruction.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the conviction.  As 
intervening Supreme Court precedent has affected the validity 
of Steiner’s 87-month sentence—an error that the government 
concedes is worthy of remand—we will vacate the judgment 
of sentence and remand for expedited resentencing. 
B. STING OPERATION, SEARCH, AND INDICTMENT  
 This case arises from a sting operation.  In August 
2007, police informant Timothy Stants told Pennsylvania 
State Trooper Thomas Baumgard that Thomas Steiner, a 
convicted felon, was staying on his (Stants’) property and was 
“on the run” from law enforcement.  Stants also claimed that 
Steiner had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner had described 
to him as a “cop killer,” and that Steiner said he would use 
the gun to avoid being arrested.  Stants claimed that the 
shotgun would be found in a camper on Stants’ property.   
 Based on Stants’ tip, Baumgard obtained a search 
warrant for the camper.  Before executing the warrant on 
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August 27, 2007, Baumgard paid Stants $100 for his help in 
securing Steiner’s arrest and told Stants to drive Steiner to a 
nearby gas station.  There, officers would be waiting to arrest 
Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner’s arrest for 
failure to appear at a preliminary hearing scheduled that same 
day, on an unrelated sexual assault charge.  Baumgard 
conducted his search of the camper in the afternoon, just after 
Stants drove Steiner away to the gas station.  He found, 
among other things, a sawed-off shotgun loaded with six 
rounds of 12-gauge shotgun ammunition; a wallet containing 
various documents, all bearing Steiner’s name; and a 
discharged shotgun shell.  Soon after the search, Baumgard 
ordered Steiner arrested on the warrant issued for his failure 
to appear at the preliminary hearing earlier that day.  At the 
time of his arrest, Steiner was in Stants’ car at a nearby gas 
station.  
 Apparently, there was more to the story than the gun 
and ammunition found in the camper.  Stants also told police 
that he had seen the missing pieces of the sawed-off shotgun 
(part of the barrel and stock) at a home that Steiner 
supposedly owned, located at Meadow Avenue (the “home” 
or the “Meadow Avenue home”).  Based on Stants’ tip, police 
obtained another search warrant, this time for the home.  
 Police executed the search warrant for the home on 
August 29, 2007.  When they arrived, they entered the 
basement of the home, which was in disarray.5  There, they 
found a shotgun stock on the bar and a shotgun barrel in the 
                                              
5 The basement was also referred to in the indictment and at 
other points during trial as the “downstairs area.”   
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ceiling where a tile was missing.6  Also, they discovered a 
hacksaw and pipe wrenches on the basement floor and a 
single 12-gauge shotgun shell in a pocket of the pool table.  
Four other 12-gauge shotgun shells were found in a bowl, on 
top of which was Steiner’s notice of impending warrant of 
arrest.  In addition to the shotgun ammunition, the police also 
discovered a variety of other types of ammunition, including 
20 rounds of .32 caliber ammunition and 17 rounds of .38 
Special ammunition.  
 Based on the shotgun and ammunition found in the 
camper, a grand jury charged Steiner with one count of being 
a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  A superseding indictment 
was filed several months later, adding a second count 
charging Steiner with a violation of § 922(g) based on the 
ammunition found in the home.  
C. THE TRIAL  
1. Testimony 
 The government’s case against Steiner proceeded to a 
jury trial.7  At trial, Steiner stipulated to having a prior felony 
                                              
6 A forensic expert later matched the stock and barrel found in 
the basement to the sawed-off shotgun found in the camper. 
7 The government proceeded against Steiner on a theory of 
constructive possession of the firearm in the camper and the 
ammunition found in his home.  Constructive possession 
occurs when a person not in actual possession “knowingly has 
both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise 
dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through 
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conviction.  He testified in his own defense and denied that he 
ever owned or possessed the shotgun or ammunition seized 
from either the camper or the basement of the home.  Steiner 
also acknowledged that he owned the wallet found in the 
camper and admitted that he owned the Meadow Avenue 
home at some point in 2007.  
 Steiner’s ex-wife, Greta Steiner, was called as a 
witness.  She testified that although she had been living at a 
different address in 2007, she occasionally stopped at the 
Meadow Avenue home to retrieve her belongings.  She also 
testified that during these visits she saw neither firearms nor 
ammunition in the home but she recalled having stored boxes 
of antique ammunition that belonged to her deceased ex-
husband in the home’s garage.  She denied that anyone ever 
brought the ammunition into the home and claimed that 
Steiner was unaware of the ammunition.  Neither Steiner nor 
the government presented evidence about whether the 
ammunition stored in the garage may have been moved to the 
basement.   
 Mark Williams, Stants’ close friend, testified for the 
government.  Williams claimed that he had been inside 
Steiner’s home in August 2007 because he was interested in 
purchasing the property.8  At that time, Williams said that he 
noticed the shotgun barrel and the hacksaw laying on a 
homemade bar and pointed them out to Stants.  Williams also 
                                                                                                     
another person or persons.”  United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 
99, 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
8 Stants and Williams further testified that Steiner sold the 
house before police searched it, and Williams claimed that his 
wife had notarized the paperwork for that sale. 
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claimed that Steiner told him that he “wouldn’t go easy” if the 
police tried to arrest him.   
 Stants also testified.  He denied receiving any benefit 
for his help in securing Steiner’s arrest, despite Baumgard’s 
testimony that he had paid Stants $100 for his assistance.  He 
also corroborated Williams’ testimony regarding the 
basement of the home and admitted that he had visited 
Steiner’s home twice in Steiner’s absence.   
2. The Government’s Arrest Warrant Evidence 
 During Steiner’s trial, the government introduced the 
arrest warrant that had issued based upon Steiner’s failure to 
appear on the sexual assault charge.  The government argued 
that the arrest warrant,9 though not the underlying conduct, 
was admissible to show that Steiner “was on the run from law 
enforcement at the time, hiding out in this trailer,” and was 
intending to “evade the warrant and not appear” at the 
preliminary hearing because “[t]hat’s what led officers to his 
trailer in the first place.”10 The government claimed that the 
arrest warrant “complete[d] the story” because it was 
“background of what led law enforcement to Mr. Steiner to 
begin with in this case.”11  However, this was not true.  
Stants’ tip regarding the shotgun was the actual source of the 
                                              
9 Our references to the unrelated arrest warrant are also, by 
extension, to any testimony or other evidence related to that 
warrant. 
10 (App. at 116.) 
11 (App. at 116.)   
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government’s initial interest in Steiner.  The District Court, 
relying on the government’s representation, admitted the 
arrest warrant evidence as “background” under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b).  The court reasoned that, as long as the 
underlying conduct was not admitted, any prejudice to Steiner 
was minimized.  The court, though, expressly rejected any 
argument that the evidence could be admitted to prove 
Steiner’s motive or intent under Rule 404(b).   
3. The District Court’s Jury Instruction on 
Unanimity 
 The government requested that the jury be instructed 
that although the defendant was charged with possessing 
ammunition in different varieties or from different locations, 
it need not unanimously agree on which ammunition he 
possessed to convict him of felony possession under § 922(g).  
Steiner objected and requested that the jury be instructed that 
it must agree as to which ammunition Steiner possessed, 
adding that the indictment was confusing.  The District Court 
adopted the government’s position and instructed the jury that 
unanimity was not required with respect to the firearm or 
ammunition.  Specifically, the court stated: 
Although all jurors must agree with respect to 
Count 1 that the Defendant possessed a firearm 
or ammunition and with respect to Count 2 that 
the Defendant possessed different ammunition, 
you need not all agree on the exact item 
possessed.  For example, if a Defendant was 
charged with possessing one piece of 
ammunition found in the bedroom, one piece of 
ammunition found in the living room, and one 
piece of ammunition found in the basement, you 
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must all unanimously agree that the Defendant 
possessed at least one piece of ammunition in 
order to convict.  You do not have to agree on 
which one or if he possessed more than one.  
Therefore, it would be sufficient if ten jurors 
determined that he possessed one piece of 
ammunition in the bedroom, one juror 
determined that he possessed one piece of 
ammunition found in the basement, and one 
juror determined that he possessed them all. In 
other words, if the Defendant is alleged to have 
been in possession of ammunition of different 
varieties or from different locations, you must 
all find that as to the ammunition charged in 
each count he possessed at least some 
ammunition as charged in that count in order to 
convict, but . . . need not all agree with respect 
to a count on exactly which ammunition was 
actually possessed as charged in that count.12 
 The jury found Steiner not guilty on Count One 
(charging possession of the gun and ammunition in the 
camper), but guilty on Count Two (charging possession of the 
ammunition found in the Meadow Avenue home). 
II. CHALLENGES TO STEINER’S CONVICTION 
A. Admission of the Arrest Warrant  
 First, Steiner argues that the District Court erred by 
admitting evidence of the arrest warrant that had issued for 
                                              
12 (App. at 342, 487-88.)  
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his failure to appear at a preliminary hearing on an unrelated 
charge.  The District Court stated during the in limine hearing 
on the admissibility of the arrest warrant, and memorialized 
in its minute entry, that its decision rested on Rule 404(b) 
grounds.13  Based on the government’s representations, the 
court admitted the evidence as “background” or to “complete 
the story” of the felon-in-possession crime.   
 Steiner argues that, while courts in this Circuit have 
occasionally admitted prior-act evidence under Rule 404(b) 
for the purpose of “completing the story” or providing 
“background,” they have also generally limited the use of 
those purposes to conspiracy cases.  In response, the 
government asserts that the arrest warrant was properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b) because it identified a proper 
purpose for the evidence: it was necessary to provide 
background and complete the story of Steiner’s arrest, 
interrogation, and the police investigation of the crimes 
charged.   
                                              
13 In its minute entry, the court stated: “[w]ith respect to the 
government’s motion in limine on 404(b) evidence [ECF No. 
99], the government may, as background, refer to the fact that 
defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant, but may 
not address the specifics of the warrant or underlying charge.”  
(App. at 28.)  The District Court also stated numerous times 
on the record that the information was admitted only for 
background purposes.  (App. at 117, 119.)  Therefore, 
Steiner’s argument that the District Court may have 
improperly admitted the arrest warrant evidence as “intrinsic” 
evidence that directly proved the crime, as opposed to prior-
act evidence under Rule 404(b), is meritless.  
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 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
District Court erred by admitting the arrest warrant.  
1. Admission of the Arrest Warrant Under 
Rule 404(b) 
   
 We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings 
principally on an abuse of discretion standard, which occurs 
only when the district court’s decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, 
or clearly unreasonable”—in short, where “no reasonable 
person would adopt the district court’s view.”14  We conduct 
“plenary review, however, of [the District Court’s] rulings to 
the extent they are based on a legal interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”15  This includes plenary review 
“of whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).”16   
 Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character or 
demonstrate action in conformity with those acts.17  Prior-act 
evidence, though, may be admitted “for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”18  To be admissible, prior-act evidence must satisfy 
the test set forth in Huddleston v. United States.19  As the 
                                              
14 United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009).   
15 Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 
(3d Cir. 1997).  
16 United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003).   
17 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
18 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
19 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
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Supreme Court stated there, the proffered evidence must be: 
(1) offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)(2); (2) 
relevant to that purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under the 
Rule 403 balancing requirement; and (4) accompanied by a 
limiting instruction, if requested.20  And, “[u]nless the reason 
is apparent from the record, a mere list of the purposes found 
in Rule 404(b) is insufficient.”21  Indeed, “[t]he district court 
must put a chain of inferences into the record, none of which 
is the inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit 
this crime.”22   
 In United States v. Green, we concluded that “allowing 
the jury to understand the circumstances surrounding the 
charged crime—completing the story—is a proper, non-
propensity purpose under Rule 404(b).”23  We also stated that 
prior-act evidence is admissible to supply “helpful 
background information to the finder of fact.”24  With all of 
this in mind, one might ask: is not all evidence helpful to 
providing background to the factfinder?  The answer is yes.  
But not all helpful evidence is relevant to a proper purpose 
under Rule 404(b). 
 In fact, Steiner is correct that the majority of criminal 
cases in which we have deemed “background” a proper 
                                              
20 Id. at 691-92.   
21 United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
22 Id. 
23 617 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2010).   
24 Id. at 250.   
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purpose involve conspiracies.25  And there is no conspiracy 
involved in this case.  Also, in at least one opinion that 
preceded our decision in Green, we specifically warned that, 
while courts have occasionally admitted prior crimes 
evidence as “background,” “this label is uninformative at best 
and, at worst, can be an unacceptable substitute for the 
analysis required by Rule 404(b).”26   
 There are unique characteristics that render 
“background” a proper purpose for admitting prior-act 
evidence in conspiracy cases.  For instance, in proving the 
existence of a conspiracy, a court might allow a party to 
present background evidence revealing an ongoing 
                                              
25 See, e.g., United States v. O’Leary, 739 F.2d 135, 136-37 
(3d Cir. 1984) (identifying the need to show “the background 
of the charges [and] the parties’ familiarity with one another” 
as a proper purpose); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 
1042, 1050 (3d Cir. 1982) (admitting similar criminal activity 
perpetrated before the period charged in the indictment to 
furnish essential background information, to demonstrate a 
continuing relationship between an unindicted co-conspirator 
and the defendant, and to assist the jurors in understanding 
the unindicted co-conspirator’s role in the forgery scheme); 
United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 58 (3d Cir. 1976) (in 
conspiracy case, upholding introduction of prior criminal acts 
by defendants because “the background information provided 
by this testimony enabled the jury to better understand [the 
witness’s] role in the bribery scheme as well as his testimony 
as a whole”).   
26 United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 
1988).   
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relationship between co-conspirators.27  Likewise, this Court 
affirmed the admission of background evidence to help the 
jury understand one conspirator’s role in a complex scheme.28  
But neither of those models applies in this case.   
 Here, Steiner is the only defendant.  There was no 
need for the government to explain a complicated backstory.  
We are not suggesting that conspiracy cases are the only ones 
in which background facts may be admissible as 404(b) 
evidence.  We are saying that, when the information needed 
to understand what happened in a case is straightforward and 
easily understood without reference to facts that do not bear 
on the charged offense, forcing extraneous and potentially 
prejudicial information into the record in the name of 
“background” is not defensible under Rule 404(b).  That, 
unfortunately, is what happened here.  Stants’ tip entirely 
explained why the government was focusing on Steiner.  In 
fact, the arrest warrant evidence was completely irrelevant to 
                                              
27 See, e.g., United States v. Corbin, No. 10-352, 2011 WL 
2110831, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (finding that the 
defendants’ prior gunpoint robberies of drug dealers were 
admissible to establish the relationships between the 
defendants and to explain the background of the conspiracy), 
aff’d, 607 F. App’x 136, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(nonprecedential). 
28 See United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 
2001) (finding no abuse of discretion and affirming 
conviction where the District Court admitted the 
government’s background evidence “to help the jury 
understand the co-conspirator’s role in the scheme”). 
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the government’s case.29  We therefore find this case to be 
sufficiently distinct from cases in which “background” 
evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b). 
 In Green, by contrast, we concluded that the 
background information—evidence that the defendant 
threatened to kill a police officer—was properly admitted 
under Rule 404(b) because it fit “into a chain of logical 
inferences” and explained why the defendant was under 
investigation for the crime charged, attempted possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine.30  We also held that the 
information was properly admitted for the purpose of proving 
the informant’s motive to cooperate, which was put at issue 
by the defendant.31  We therefore find Green distinguishable 
insofar as the prior-act evidence there served to complete the 
story of the crime charged.  Here, we conclude that evidence 
of the outstanding arrest warrant on the unrelated sexual 
assault charge had nothing whatsoever to do with Steiner’s 
charged  crime of felony possession of a weapon or 
ammunition under § 922(g). 
 Again, to be clear, we do not conclude that any 
evidence offered for the purpose of providing background is 
only admissible in conspiracy cases.  There may—and likely 
                                              
29 As to the second Huddleston factor, relevance, Fed. R. 
Evid. 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if (1) it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence, and (2) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.” 
30 Green, 617 F.3d at 250.    
31 Id.   
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will—be other situations in which such evidence is 
admissible outside of the conspiracy context.  Nor do we 
venture to paint the absolute contours of when prior-act 
evidence may be admissible to provide background under 
Rule 404(b).  We simply conclude that, on these facts, the 
District Court abused its discretion by admitting the arrest 
warrant evidence for the purpose of providing background. 
 To be sure, the District Court was not entirely, or even 
primarily, to blame for its error.  The government played a 
central role.  Here, the prosecutor wrongly asserted that the 
government needed the unrelated arrest warrant to prove that 
Steiner was guilty of felony possession.  Yet it is clear to us 
that the government did not need the arrest warrant to try a 
case against Steiner at all.  The government had Stants’ tip, 
Stants’ and Williams’ testimony that Steiner owned the home 
in 2007 and possessed a shotgun, and a stipulation that 
Steiner was a felon.  Taken together, this evidence strongly 
supported the government’s theory that Steiner unlawfully 
possessed the firearm and ammunition.  The only purpose the 
arrest warrant served was to improperly suggest that Steiner 
was predisposed to commit criminal acts.  
 In sum, we are deeply troubled by the government’s 
inaccurate claim that the arrest warrant was “what led officers 
to [Steiner’s] trailer in the first place,” and we are persuaded 
that that inaccuracy led the District Court to err by admitting 
evidence of the warrant.32  We therefore admonish the 
                                              
32 (App. at 116.) 
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government to take greater care in its representations to the 
trial court and not brandish Rule 404(b) so cavalierly.33  
2. Whether the error was harmless 
 While we find that the District Court improperly 
admitted the arrest warrant, we conclude that the error was 
harmless.34  We can call a nonconstitutional error harmless, 
and uphold the conviction, if there is a high probability that 
“the error did not contribute to the judgment,” requiring us to 
have a “sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant.”35   
 First, the arrest warrant evidence had no prejudicial 
impact on the jury’s determination as to Count One, because 
Steiner was found not guilty of that charge.  It is therefore 
reasonable to infer that the evidence had no effect as to Count 
                                              
33 Because we conclude that the District Court erred by 
admitting the arrest warrant evidence as “background,” we 
need not reach Steiner’s argument that the court failed to 
conduct a proper Rule 403 analysis.  Nor need we reach the 
government’s argument that Steiner waived his Rule 403 
argument by failing to object.  And, as to the fourth 
Huddleston factor, we note that the District Court did not give 
a limiting instruction to the jury because Steiner did not 
request one.  
34 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) provides: “Any error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights 
must be disregarded.”   
35 United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 285 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 
308, 326 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Two.  Second, the District Court did not disclose the conduct 
underlying the arrest warrant, that is, the alleged sexual 
assault of a minor.  Third, at trial, Steiner stipulated to having 
a prior felony conviction.  Also, when he took the stand, 
Steiner admitted that he was previously convicted of crimes 
of falsehood: burglary, theft, and felony forgery.  And finally, 
the ample evidence presented surrounding Steiner’s 
ownership and occupation of the home, Stants’ and Williams’ 
testimony regarding the same, and the lack of evidence 
linking the antique ammunition in the garage to the 
ammunition found in the home, convinces us that the 
additional arrest warrant evidence did not affect the jury’s 
guilty verdict as to Count Two.   
 We therefore conclude that any error in admitting the 
prior act evidence under Rule 404(b) was harmless. 
B. Steiner’s Jury Instruction Challenge 
 
 Next, Steiner argues in his briefs that the District Court 
erred by refusing to instruct jurors that they must 
unanimously agree as to which ammunition he possessed to 
find him guilty under Count Two.  In support of his claim, 
Steiner argues that the government improperly bundled into 
Count Two multiple, distinct violations of § 922(g), each of 
which should have been prosecuted as a separate violation of 
the statute.36  Put another way, he claims that the indictment 
                                              
36 The government argues that Steiner waived any “duplicity” 
argument by not raising it below.  We disagree.  Steiner never 
moved to dismiss the indictment before or during trial on the 
grounds that the government improperly joined possession of 
separate types of ammunition into one count.  However, 
Steiner’s counsel clearly objected to the jury instruction, 
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was “duplicitous” because the government improperly joined 
possession of separate types of ammunition into one count.37  
To cure this defect, Steiner contends that the District Court 
should have instructed the jury that it had to unanimously 
determine which ammunition Steiner possessed to find him 
guilty on Count Two.  By expressly declining to give this 
curative jury instruction, Steiner argues that the District Court 
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous 
jury verdict, and therefore his conviction under Count Two 
should be vacated.   
 We reject Steiner’s argument.  In our view, the 
evidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that Steiner 
possessed the ammunition in one part of the Meadow Avenue 
home, which he owned in 2007.  For the additional reasons 
that follow, we therefore conclude the indictment properly 
charged Steiner with a single violation of § 922(g) under 
Count Two and that a special unanimity instruction was not 
required.  
                                                                                                     
specifically requesting that the jury be instructed that it must 
agree as to which ammunition Steiner possessed and adding 
that the “indictment [c]ounts [were] confusing.” (App. at 97.)  
In consequence, we find that Steiner’s “duplicity” argument 
was preserved on appeal in connection with his jury 
instruction challenge.  
37 Count Two of the indictment charged possession of various 
pieces of ammunition in the “downstairs area” of the home.   
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 Whether an indictment is duplicitous is a question of 
law subject to de novo review.38  We also review de novo 
“whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal 
standard.”39  “We review the refusal to give a particular 
instruction or the wording of instructions for abuse of 
discretion.”40  
 Duplicity is the improper combining of separate 
offenses into a single count.41  When a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict is jeopardized 
by a duplicitous indictment, a court can cure the indictment 
by issuing a limiting instruction requiring the jury to 
unanimously find the defendant guilty of at least one distinct 
act.42 
 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(3)(B), a motion alleging a defect in the indictment must 
be made before trial.  Yet while a defendant waives technical 
errors to an indictment by his failure to object to the duplicity 
before trial, courts have held that the alleged harm to the 
defendant’s substantive rights resulting from a duplicitous 
indictment can be raised at trial or on appeal, notwithstanding 
                                              
38 United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1998). 
39 United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). 
40 United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006). 
41 Haddy, 134 F.3d at 548.   
42 See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 20-28 (1st 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 702 (8th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Pietrantonio, 637 F.3d 865, 869 
(8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Starks, 472 F.3d 466, 471 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
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the defendant’s failure to make a pretrial motion.43  “The 
rationale for this distinction is that, whereas Rule 12 applies 
only to defects in the institution of criminal proceedings . . . ,  
a verdict rendered by a less-than-unanimous jury violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by a harm that arises 
from the trial itself.”44  
 Count Two of the indictment charged Steiner with a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which, in relevant part, 
provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person who has been 
convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce.” 
 To determine whether Count Two was duplicitous, we 
first focus on the “allowable unit of prosecution” to decide 
whether the indictment properly charges a violation of the 
relevant statute.45  We have held that the allowable unit of 
                                              
43 United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 
1997); see also United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 958 
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[i]t is black letter law that 
duplicitous indictments can be cured through appropriate jury 
instructions”); Haddy, 134 F.3d at 547-48. 
44 United States v. Kakos, 483 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973), and 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
45 Haddy, 134 F.3d at 548. 
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prosecution under § 922(g) is the “incident of possession,” 
regardless of whether a defendant possessed more than one 
firearm, or possessed a firearm and ammunition.46  In other 
words, we ask if the evidence establishes that the defendant 
committed a single act of possessing firearms or ammunition, 
or instead whether the evidence indicates that multiple, 
distinct acts of unlawful possession occurred. 
 We have also stated that simultaneous possession of 
multiple firearms or pieces of ammunition does not give rise 
to a separate offense for each firearm or piece of ammunition 
possessed.47  Likewise, multiple convictions for possession of 
multiple firearms may be appropriate where the firearms in 
question were seized in different locations or if they were 
acquired in separate transactions.48   
 These observations lead us to the question of how we 
determine whether an indictment is duplicitous when 
someone is charged with felony possession of various types 
of ammunition, all of which are located in the basement of a 
home.  In resolving Steiner’s challenge, our prior cases 
provide us with sufficient guidance.  In this case, we conclude 
that the indictment was not duplicitous and that a curative 
jury instruction was not required. 
                                              
46 United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009). 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 298 
(1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that the government properly 
charged the defendant with two counts of possessing a 
firearm in violation § 922(g) where twenty-three guns were 
recovered from the same defendant in two separate locations). 
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 In United States v. Marino and United States v. 
Frankenberry, we held that the simultaneous possession or 
receipt of several firearms by a convicted felon constituted a 
single offense under the predecessor statutes to § 922(g), 
absent a showing that the weapons were separately stored or 
acquired.49  We further elaborated on the concept of 
simultaneous possession in United States v. Tann.  In Tann, 
the indictment charged the defendant with two separate 
§ 922(g) violations based upon possession of a gun found in 
the bathroom where he was arrested and ammunition that was 
located in his pocket at the same time.50  There, we 
determined that the two items were simultaneously possessed.  
As a result, we concluded that possession of both a firearm 
and ammunition, seized at the same time in the same location, 
supported only one conviction and sentence under § 922(g).51   
 However, in United States v. Kennedy, we held that 
mere physical proximity does not demonstrate simultaneous 
possession.52  There, we declined to find simultaneous 
possession where firearms were stored in two separate 
vehicles located on the same premises.53  In reaching this 
conclusion, we specifically noted that, when determining 
                                              
49United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 245-46 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)); United States v. 
Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 1982) (analyzing 18 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)). 
50 Tann, 577 F.3d at 536-37. 
51 Id. at 537. 
52 682 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir. 2012). 
53 Id. 
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whether firearms are simultaneously possessed, what matters 
is the defendant’s “course of . . . treatment of the firearms,” 
which “may not be viewed in a frozen, momentary state 
immediately prior to the seizure.”54  We therefore held that 
the district court erred when it merged two separate felony 
possession counts for purposes of resentencing the 
defendant.55   
 These cases demonstrate that determining whether 
individual firearms or ammunition were simultaneously 
possessed is a highly fact-driven inquiry that depends on the 
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s alleged conduct. 
 Here, other than Steiner’s testimony, there is little, if 
any, evidence supporting Steiner’s contention that the 
ammunition found in the home was acquired at different 
times and for different purposes, or that it was separately 
stored in the home.  By contrast, the evidence at trial strongly 
demonstrated that Steiner owned the home in 2007 and that 
all of the ammunition was stored in various parts of the 
basement.56  Moreover, at least some of the 12-gauge 
ammunition was literally found resting under Steiner’s notice 
of impending warrant of arrest.  And, while Steiner’s ex-wife 
                                              
54 Id. at 255-56 (quoting United  States v. Mullins, 698 F.2d 
686, 687 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
55 Id. 
56 While Stants and Mark Williams testified that Steiner sold 
the house before the August 29 search and that Williams’ 
wife notarized the paperwork, other testimony also confirms 
that Steiner owned the house sometime in 2007 before 
abandoning it. 
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testified that she brought various types of antique ammunition 
into the garage in 1999, none of the ammunition that Steiner 
was charged with possessing was located in the garage, and 
none of the physical evidence specifically linked the 
ammunition found in the basement to Greta Steiner or her 
deceased ex-husband.  Moreover, even if we accepted that 
Greta Steiner purchased the ammunition found in the 
basement in the first instance, the jury could have found that 
Steiner himself later acquired the ammunition from Greta 
Steiner, and not, as Steiner claims, from other sources on 
other occasions. 
 In sum, we conclude that the indictment was not 
duplicitous.  Accordingly, the District Court’s failure to give 
a special unanimity instruction as to Count Two did not 
constitute a violation of Steiner’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
unanimous jury verdict.57  
                                              
57 Kakos, 483 F.3d at 446. 
Steiner also asks us to reconsider our current legal standard 
for assessing claims of pre-indictment delay.  See United 
States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(defendant must show both actual prejudice and deliberate 
delay) (citing United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 168 (3d 
Cir. 1987)).  However, “[u]nder a longstanding practice of 
our Court, a panel may not overrule another panel decision.”  
Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 534 (3d 
Cir. 2002); see also 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1.  We therefore will not 
undertake to reconsider our standard for reviewing claims of 
pre-indictment delay.  Moreover, we conclude that contrary to 
Steiner’s assertion, the District Court applied the correct legal 
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III. CHALLENGE TO STEINER’S SENTENCE AFTER 
MATHIS 
We now turn to Steiner’s challenge to his sentence, 
which he invoked in his petition for certiorari (but not in his 
initial appeal to us).58   
By way of background, the offense Guideline 
applicable to Steiner’s § 922(g) conviction is § 2K2.1,59 
which sets out various base offense levels that depend on the 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s criminal 
history.  At sentencing, the District Court determined that the 
appropriate base offense level was 20—corresponding to 
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)—because of a predicate conviction for a 
“crime of violence”: a 1993 Pennsylvania burglary 
conviction.  Section 2K2.1 does not itself define “crime of 
violence.”  Instead, it refers to the language of § 4B1.2(a), 
which specifically defines “burglary of a dwelling” as a crime 
of violence.  Alongside Steiner’s criminal history score of VI, 
a base offense level of 20 yielded a Guidelines range of 70–
87 months in prison.  As mentioned earlier, Steiner was 
sentenced to the high end of that range, receiving 87 months.  
                                                                                                     
standard when it denied Steiner’s motion to dismiss the 
indictment for pre-indictment delay. 
58 Steiner’s sentence was the subject of extensive litigation 
before the District Court, but we need not recount that history 
now.  See generally Tentative Findings and Rulings, ECF No. 
152 (discussing the parties’ sentencing positions and the 
District Court’s preliminary findings).   
59 We refer throughout to the 2013 edition of the Guidelines 
manual. 
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Steiner filed a petition for certiorari on the basis of the 
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Mathis v. United 
States.60  Pointing to Mathis, Steiner argued that his 1993 
Pennsylvania burglary conviction was no longer categorically 
a crime of violence.  Without the enhancement, Steiner’s base 
offense level would have been 14, not 20, thereby yielding a 
sentencing range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment—a range 
of possibilities all markedly below the 87-month within-
Guideline sentence he had actually received.   
As instructed by the Supreme Court’s GVR order, we 
now consider the application of Mathis to Steiner’s sentence.  
Although the parties agree on Mathis’s effect, it is not for 
them to say.  Rather, “[t]his question . . . is one for the 
courts—not the parties—to decide.”61 
Mathis is the latest in the Supreme Court’s series of 
opinions on how prior convictions can be used as predicate 
“violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)), precedent that generally 
applies also to “crimes of violence” enhancements under the 
Guidelines.62  Mathis further refined the Court’s 
jurisprudence about when, in applying an elements-based 
enhancement or analysis, a court may use the “modified 
categorical approach”—appropriate for statutes that are 
“divisible,” listing elements in the alternative or describing 
                                              
60 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
61 United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968)). 
62 See United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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separate crimes, and which is employed to determine what 
crime a defendant was actually convicted of—instead of the 
“categorical approach,” to which we turn when a statute is not 
divisible.63  
In Mathis, the Supreme Court analyzed an Iowa 
burglary statute that prohibited unlawful entry into not just 
“buildings or other structures”—which is the “generic” 
federal definition of burglary64—but also into “land, water, or 
air vehicle[s].”65  The Court explained that the Iowa statute 
laid out not separate elements, but alternative ways of 
satisfying a single locational element; “the statute defines one 
crime, with one set of elements, broader than generic 
burglary.”66  Because a “state crime cannot qualify as an 
ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those of a 
listed generic offense,” a conviction under Iowa’s burglary 
statute could not suffice under the proper elements-based 
categorical approach.67  The District Court had erred by using 
a “modified categorical approach” instead, treating the 
statute’s separate means of committing the offense as if they 
were elements.  The District Court therefore looked at the 
                                              
63 See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 278-79 (3d Cir. 
2016) (discussing the categorical and modified categorical 
approaches post-Mathis in the context of an immigration 
case).  
64 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, 2250 (citations omitted).   
65 Id. at 2250 (quoting Iowa Code § 702.12 (2013)).  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 2251.  
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“records of [Mathis’s] prior convictions [to] determin[e] that 
he had burgled structures, rather than vehicles.”68 
The relevant 1992 Pennsylvania statute has many of 
the same features as the Iowa statute discussed in Mathis.  
The Pennsylvania statute defined burglary as “enter[ing] a 
building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime 
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public 
or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.”69  “Occupied 
structure,” addressed one section earlier, meant “[a]ny 
structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business 
therein, whether or not a person is actually present.”70   
The question Mathis tells us to ask—are these alternate 
means or alternate elements?—can be resolved by reference 
to “authoritative sources of state law” or, if necessary, “the 
record of a prior conviction itself . . . for the sole and limited 
purpose of determining whether” we confront means or 
                                              
68 See id. at 2250, 2253.  
69 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(A) (1992).  Pennsylvania’s 
burglary statute has been amended several times since 1992, 
with the most recent amendment taking effect in early 
January 2017. See An Act Amending Titles 18 (Crimes and 
Offenses) and 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 2016 Pa. Laws 158. We 
do not today formally reach Mathis’s effect on convictions 
under the amended versions of the burglary statute. 
70 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3501 (1992).  
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elements.71  In this case, the 1993 Pennsylvania information 
charged Steiner with “feloniously . . . enter[ing] a building or 
occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion 
thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein,” although the 
information did identify the specific “location” immediately 
following.72  To the extent this is equivocal, we note that 
Pennsylvania’s model criminal jury instructions, albeit for the 
current version of the statute, “do[] not require the jury to 
unanimously agree on the nature of the location; it can be a 
building, or occupied structure, or a separately secured or 
occupied portion of a building or structure.”73  By contrast, it 
appears that jury findings are generally required for a defense 
pertaining to appropriate grading of the burglary offense, 
namely whether the structure was not adapted for overnight 
accommodation and was not occupied.74  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has also referred to its burglary statute as an 
“expan[sion]” of the “common law definition” of the crime, 
enacted to “recognize[] that non-privileged entries into any of 
these areas is a burglary because such entries pose a threat of 
violence to persons.”75  This discussion of the broad scope of 
                                              
71 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256-57 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).     
72 See Information, ECF No. 144-1.  
73 United States v. Harris, No. 1:CR-06-0268, ___ F. Supp. 
3d ___, 2016 WL 4539183, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2016) 
(citing Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury 
Instructions § 15.3502).  
74 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(C)(1) (1992); Commonwealth 
v. Conaway, 105 A.3d 755, 763 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), appeal 
denied, 118 A.3d 1107 (Pa. 2015).  
75 Commonwealth v. Rolan, 549 A.2d 553, 559 (Pa. 1988). 
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burglary as a single crime that reaches multiple kinds of 
unlawful entry strongly suggests that the statute’s breadth 
turns on means, not elements.   
We therefore hold that these are alternative means of 
committing the core burglary element.76  The statute is not 
divisible and, after Mathis, a categorical approach, rather than 
a modified categorical approach, must be used. 
We pause to recognize that other Courts of Appeals 
have, after Mathis, held that various state burglary statutes set 
out different elements, and not different means, based on the 
wording of particular statutes.  The Iowa burglary statute 
analyzed in Mathis defines burglary as the entering of “an 
occupied structure,” a term it then defines elsewhere.77  In 
other words, the Iowa burglary statute itself makes reference 
to a single locational element without employing a disjunctive 
list.  In United States v. Gundy, by contrast, the Eleventh 
                                              
76 This comports, to an extent, with our 1996 decision in 
United States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Reaching the same statutory language, we held that the 
Pennsylvania definition of occupied structure “makes 
Pennsylvania’s burglary statute broader than Congress’s 
generic view of burglary,” as it reaches scenarios such as the 
unauthorized entry of a car.  Id. at 1109.  While at the time we 
thought that the statute’s breadth authorized use of what 
would now be called the modified categorical approach, see 
id. at 1110, it is now clear under Mathis that alternative 
means, rather than alternative elements, do not render the 
statute divisible.   
77 See Iowa Code §§ 713.1 (defining burglary), 702.12 
(defining occupied structure).   
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Circuit confronted a Georgia statute that listed what the court 
described as “three subsets of different locational elements, 
stated in the alternative and in the disjunctive.”78  Informed 
by an analysis of Georgia state opinions about burglary, the 
divided Eleventh Circuit panel determined that the statute 
listed alternative elements, not means, and was thus 
divisible.79  Other courts have reached similar conclusions.80   
Based on our discussion above of Pennsylvania law 
and practice, as well as the substantial overlap between 
“building” and “occupied structure” under the statutory 
definition, we believe that we are on solid footing.  
Nevertheless, the divergence of outcomes after Mathis 
suggests that the “elements or means” inquiry is not quite as 
easy as the Supreme Court thought, not the least because state 
legislatures and state courts do not draft their laws and craft 
their decisions with this particular distinction in mind. 
Returning to our analysis, we next compare the 
Pennsylvania statute to the generic offense of “burglary of a 
dwelling.”  We have previously defined “dwelling” by 
                                              
78 842 F.3d 1156, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-7-1(a) (2011)). 
79 See id. at 1167-68.   
80 See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 844 F.3d 712, 715-16 (8th 
Cir. 2016) (coming to a similar outcome); United States v. 
Uribe, 838 F.3d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (same).  But see 
United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 834-38 (7th Cir. 
2016) (finding that disjunctive parts of a statute were means, 
not elements, while observing that state decisions and 
practices did not definitively answer the question).   
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reference to the then-current Sixth Edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary: a “building or portion thereof, a tent, a mobile 
home, a vehicle or other enclosed space which is used or 
intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.”81  
The Pennsylvania statute plainly sweeps more broadly than 
“burglary” narrowed to dwellings.82   
Under the categorical approach, then, a conviction 
under the Pennsylvania burglary statute in question is not a 
predicate § 4B1.2 “crime of violence.”83  Thus, Steiner’s 
                                              
81 United States v. McClenton, 53 F.3d 584, 587 (3d Cir. 
1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dwelling, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).  Beginning with the Seventh 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, “Dwelling” falls under the 
main entry of “Dwelling-house,” of which it is considered to 
be an abbreviation.  The “Criminal Law” meaning of 
“Dwelling-house” is currently defined as follows: “A 
building, a part of a building, a tent, a mobile home, or 
another enclosed space that is used or intended for use as a 
human habitation.”  Dwelling-house, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). 
82 It appears to be broader than plain generic burglary, too. 
For instance, the unlawful entry of a river gambling boat, 
which is a “vehicle” adapted for “carrying on business 
therein,” seems to fall under the Pennsylvania statute’s 
definition of “burglary,” but not the generic federal offense as 
articulated by the Supreme Court.   
83 We have previously held that the “residual clause” of 
§ 4B1.2 is unconstitutionally vague.  See Calabretta, 831 
F.3d at 133-34.  The precise question of the clause’s validity 
is now pending before the United States Supreme Court in 
Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544.  If it is reinstated by 
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1993 burglary conviction should not have been used to 
enhance his sentence.  As the government concedes plain 
error,84 we will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand 
for expedited resentencing.  
We must reach one final matter before closing: Steiner 
contends that he has already served a term of imprisonment 
longer than would be authorized by a Guidelines range 
without the “crime of violence” enhancement.  As we noted 
above, at offense level 14 and with a criminal history of VI, 
Steiner’s range would be 37–46 months instead of the 70–87 
months he faced before.  Although Steiner does not provide 
us with the Bureau of Prisons information he used to compute 
the months he has already served—he was serving a state 
sentence when the underlying federal criminal proceedings 
began, and there is no obvious indication on the docket of 
when he was formally committed to the Bureau of Prisons—it 
appears likely that he has already been in the custody of the 
Bureau of Prisons for over 46 months, and the government 
does not dispute his characterization of his time served.  We 
therefore will order that Steiner be released from custody, 
subject to the conditions of supervised release imposed in the 
District Court’s original judgment, pending expedited 
resentencing. 
                                                                                                     
the Supreme Court, the District Court should not consider it 
on remand, as the government has not argued that it should 
apply.   
84 See United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 206-09 & n.7 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment of conviction, vacate its judgment 
of sentence, grant Steiner’s motion for remand, and remand 
for expedited resentencing.  Steiner is ordered released 
pending his resentencing.  
